The purpose , I propose, is to show how, in the dialectical perspective of Hegel (and Marx, the which, albeit with certain modifications, resumes and continues), the objective dimension the historical movement not only opposes the moment of subjectivity, but also makes it one of its essential component.
In this sense, we must recognize that short writings of the young Lukacs - like his Lenin other essay entitled What is orthodox Marxism - as opposed to that Marxism objectivist and scientistic it went gradually imposing itself in the Third International sign-in some ways-a kind of revenge on Plachanov Lenin, I am still able to give us a reflection of the dialectical perspective of recovery, particularly to the problems of time, which we live.
To do this I use a well-known and important text of Hegel, or even its Preface / Vorrede to Phenomenology of Mind, during which partial analysis, I will also show the essential consonances with the positions of Marx. Two final details.
In reality, we examine the totality of the Hegelian text, and hence the richness of the themes dealt with in it: we will rather to clarify (to try to clarify) what Hegel meant by this understanding of philosophy and how this act-this-understanding implicit mediation Logic and history, subjective and objective.
As you know, Vorrede Hegel begins with the statement that with respect to a philosophical writings, is not only unnecessary but also inappropriate and contrary to the purpose, precede a Vorrede, which claims to explain what purpose the author has placed and what would be its relationship with those who have already covered the same topic. [1]
is easy to understand the beginning of the Hegel's text, if we prsente that the purpose of Hegel is to underline a philosophical work that has a weight and a range of objective , they emerge as they that work takes place, it is clarified, is placed in historical context .
short, the philosophical work is an objective presence , whose meaning is objectively determinable through the understanding of its actual be placed in historical context.
From this point of view, even the opinion that the author himself may have about his work, will expire at the level of a particular belief and, therefore, an outlet position, always somewhat arbitrary. Understand the meaning of a philosophy involves, on the contrary, the historical trace-back and the end result that is reached, thus placing itself objectively, even in relation to other historical and current philosophies.
Which means, among other things, that philosophical truth can not be given in advance of the historical development of philosophy (and, therefore, did not even write a Vorrede sense, in the usual sense of term).
As he adds Hegel, philosophy, and universal intertwine with each other, if there are not one another, can rise to the mistaken belief that the essence of what is expressed in more depth, the purpose and ultimate results, in short, from end point, while the process through which the philosophy that just comes result is dropped, is neglected.
In this way, however, the philosophy, of which he is concerned, ends up dissolving into a generality, no determination and, therefore, something dead, crystallized, non-vital .
Taking advantage of what has been seen, we could say that the specific sense of philosophy, of which he is concerned, can never be caught if, in knowledge, separate from particular or universal, in other words, the end result , which that philosophy comes from historical process that has made this result possible. If we call
synchronic structure configuration, that philosophy assumes in its final outcome, and if we let diachronic process the way, the same philosophy must overcome to achieve that result, then we understand that Hegel is saying this: you do not understand a philosophy opposing historical process to its logical structure (or vice versa), it is understood only if these two elements (or dimensions) are captured in their interrelationship in their born from one another. [2]
certainly will not surprise if, at this point, I urge to reconsider the pages of Marx's methodological of 1857 to Introduction to the Critique of ' political economy, which is consonant with Hegel's argument, I think, even transparent. Let
the conclusion that, at this point, Hegel comes: according to my conception ( Einsicht )-he wrote-(concept which, of course, should and can be justified only by exposure of the same philosophical system) what matters ( Ankommen darauf ) is to conceive and express the truth, not as substance but as subject. [3]
Why is being a living substance, which is actually subject that-but it means the same thing-say, the subject is real as active ( wirklich ), to the extent that the movement is put himself or mediation with itself and becoming something else . [4]
How clear is this-for us-the central point, because it invites us to recognize the movement as a manifestation of goal center of activity, which is not random but is finalized, it is not only necessary (and, therefore, Hegel's expression of pure natural), nor is episodic or free because otherwise tends to result .
A place of business, therefore, is subject , because determined by the stress in his work to translate into actual existence an internal urge to certain results, fulfilling that which most deeply characterizes' essence of that place of business.
-Who-is organized by her, it moves, it relates takes place, not coincidentally-we know-but yes according to the result to be achieved under the conditions of development given here because the historical development and result are separable, but, well, that's why this place of business or, metaphorically, the movement goal, should be seen as a manifestation of a person who fills unfolding [5] . If, as we said, this is indeed the central reason for our thesis, then we try to deepen their understanding.
Another common error of conscience, says Hegel, is to see only contradictions in diversity of the many philosophical systems and this is because the difference is just exchanged one-to-consciousness coll ' opposition. [6]
In other words, just because the movement goal is subject, then grows and develops only in the battle, or rather, grows and develops, denying [7] constantly and overcoming the various phases or stages of progress, the various figures, in the making, is rising. It 's so that these various steps or figures are hunted, removed [8]
But these same steps or figures, certainly one hostile towards the 'other, exclusive one of the other, are not, however, stiffened in this mode of existence: in fact, they must be recognized, on the contrary, a nature fluid, such that, even in their mutual intolerance, they are revealed simultaneously, all moments of a same process, components of a same totality, therefore, not only denial of each other, but yes, even the one o'clock condition of existence other. [9] At this point, Hegel comes to another important conclusion.
The common consciousness, that sees only in the diversity and opposition that can not mediate logic and history in the real movement, but that is fixed, however, in the crystallization of ' one of the two (or the history of logic , identical or opposite, of the objective or the subjective ), is unable to penetrate the same thing, to understand the true essence, because the surface remains, as it closes in that eighth, in that perspective (religious, in fact [10] ) that for every goes a strict logic of identity and contradiction - in any sense of the term - is rigorously excluded.
To say it another way, the historical movement-that is, the product of complex relationships, conflict, and shall always auf Umwegen and never directly, the man with the members and the nature-, time we know it, because its different sides, the various contradictions, we see them as necessary items in the process.
which is subjective for this: as the historical movement in its dissonances, contradictions and disharmony, in fact, is humanity itself that goes on, leading, is humanity itself that the turning- nature and discovering new sides and possibilities-change and develop itself.
[2] - To use, do that here in synchrony and diachrony, cf. G. Della Volpe, On the dialectic, in G. Della Volpe, Works. Vol 6.
[5] - Even if we address this issue, we may say that, subject to all the differences of the case, the Freudian conception of the self can serve to begin to clarify the Hegelian notion of the subject.
[6] - Implicitly, this tells us the concern of Hegel save the difference and, therefore, do not disperse in the apparent homogeneous fluid level of abstraction. Again, this is a sense of the need to know a philosophical system, to weave the historical path and the final result, the diversity of historical and logical structure. It 's the same need to show Marx, Critique of Political Economy.
[7] - It 's clear that there would try to make sense of the Hegelian denial, and just a technical term to the vocabulary of formal logic.
[8] - Note that the word used by Hegel verdrängen , that is the same used by Freud to describe the action of removing .
[10] - "... the ... ... monosyllabic speeches, like those of the Christian, whose words should be: Yes, yes! No, no! "(Marx, 18 Brumaire , Rome, 1977: 118). 
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