translate Franz's article appeared under the title-Hinkelammert Kritik of Political Oekonomie, Religionskritik Humanismus und der Praxis. in number 2 of 2010 the German magazine Marxistische Blaetter-communist, because it marked the beginning of a debate, which appeared later in the same journal, and we seem to iinteresse significant in the current political and cultural . Obviously, then, we will consider the whole debate.
Stefano Garroni
In crisis in which we live today and that annnciano for the future, it is undoubtedly necessary to discuss what, today, can mean humanism. I intend to present some arguments in this regard. But before doing so, I would like to quickly analyze what humanism meant in Modena. I intend to do this very quickly and then to board a key moment in our history, which is closely linked to what, today, humanism can mean. This key point is the French Revolution. It comes at a time, in which the world market has established itself as the capitalist market. The humanism of the French Revolution is still mostly ( äußerst ) reduced to a man's abstract humanism, which is seen as proprietary. But this very French Revolution, which flows into a pure bourgeois revolution, at the same time based categories, from which you can establish a new humanism.
They are mainly two categories: on the one hand, they provoke a reaction to the overall reduction of human rights to those of abstract man, the principal owner, based on a situation of extreme exploitation and forced labor in the form of mass slavery. On the other hand, in the Revolution were placed politico-legal category of citizenship. These became the basis of modern democracy, al still limited to white men and owners. Relying on the category of citizenship and its continuous extension causes a movement for human rights, which defines the future struggles for the emancipation of man. The man as a citizen is not necessarily a citizen, but can be represented emancipation, which extend beyond bourgeois society.
First here is the emancipation of slaves, women and the working class. It can symbolize the depth of the conflict through three major deaths: the death of Olympia de Gouges, who represents the right of women to become citizens and who was beheaded. Similarly died guillotined Babeuf, which is the right of association for workers. Toussaint-Louverture, the liberator of the slaves in Haiti, was arrested and killed, under the Emperor Napoleon. (P.72).
The so-called claims of emancipation was the product of the French Revolution, but reversed against it, the fact that the revolution came ever more clearly defined as bourgeois. Later appeared demanded more of emancipation, like that of the colonies, culture and nature exploited and destroyed. This emancipation costringno most thrilling in the system brghese confrontardi with the sacrifices, h are the product of his stessosvilupo. In this sense, we feel a new humanism. That is, the humanism of the living man as subject, against the reduction of bourgeois humanism all'umansimodel owner as part of the market, which he soon tendency to recognize as the only human right: ; the property (72). These lote for emancipation have achieved significant successes, as underlying human rights, which are now entered in the Constitution. However, the reduction of human rights the right to property has a tendency to cancel all the others again.
Currently, the strategy of globalization, which immediately produced a number of disasters, once again a great opportunity, on behalf dellla Totalize market and pfoprietà private Codest the nullification of Human Rights as a living subject-rights which are the result of the struggle for emancipation of the last centuries, but this is also the problem humanism today.
to the merits of this issue, I begin with an analysis of humanism, for that after the French Rivouzione and until the first half of the ninth century worked against the reduction of human relations to relations between commodities. As was already the case in the formulation bourgeois humanism of the eighteenth century, this new formulation of the subject of humanism, criticism of religion-in the sense of critical Uun against it-was an element essential : formulation of humanism and criticism of religion should always be hand in hand.
Here I will build on the critique of religion, which formulates the young Marx, the Ascope to analyze what this becomes critical in the later Marx and how it reports to the criticism of religion, which is located in the theology of liberation. I'd start with some quotes that might show this starting position:
1. In the Preface to his doctoral thesis in 1841, Marx says that 'philosophy', which in this work has already seen as critical theory, are against all heavenly and earthly gods who do not acknowledge human self-consciousness as the highest deity. Here, the human self-consciousness is the highest deity of deities against any earthly or heavenly. In Marx, self-consciousness must always be understood as self-conscious, "consciousness can not be other than be fit and being conscious of man and the actual process of life: self-awareness is therefore the human conscience, as if himself in his real-life process.
2. In his critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right of 1844, Marx said: "The criticism of religion ends with the doctrine that man is the highest essence for the man himself, that ends with the categorical imperative to get rid of all those relationships in which man is decreased essence, enslaved, despised. "Instead of self as the highest human god is also the place expression, secono which man is the highest essence for man. Marx also shows that when you declare something different man maximum essence you end up doing something less human, enslaved and dispezzato.
If we combine the two quotations, we have two fundamental propositions of this, which shows how the paradigm dellla Marxist critique of religion:
1. Critical theory stands against any earthly or heavenly god, who does not agree that è'uomo is highest essence for man itself.
2. Critical theory is opposed to any earthly or heavenly deity in whose name the man is not the highest essence for man, but precisely because of this, something fell, enslaved, despised.
Queso diffeenziazione counts as a criterion for religion, not as an attack locknut it. This is true, as it moves from Marx, that religion thus becomes superfluous. But even if religion does not would be superfluous, this criticism, however, confirms its full value, since its meaning is confined to a criterion of differentiation. (73).
Marx says something for our representation of Marx is quite strange: God became man, but he says that is not in a religious sense, but yes anthropology. He also says what man does, if it becomes for the man himself, the highest essence, then, if the man wants to become the god of man himself. Again, this is something completely different from our normal shows. The man throws away all those relationships, in which an essence is impoverished, enslaved and dispezzata. And 'this practice, which makes it possible for another world. In this practice we have the autorealizazione man. This is the paradigm of the Marxist critique of religion and at the same time, the Marxian paradigm of humanism. And, at the same time, it seems to be the paradigm of critical thinking as such.
eligione This is the criticism of the young Marx. Here is not merely criticized the religion, so religion is rather CONCP ( erfassen ) critically. That religion is not dead, as Marx expected, this is quite secondary.
Our analysis has so far focused exclusively on the young Marx. The Marx later pursued further this critique of religion, but change the words with which it is expressed: the criticism of religion is becoming critical to fetishism. (74). This is not no cut neto, but even a simple exchange of words, rather than a change of centroid . In the preface to his dissertation, Marx's denunciation of worldly and heavenly, in its Critique of Philosophy of Law Hegel, Mara proclaimed the end of the criticism of religion. Now Marx no longer speaks of the heavenly gods, but rather than land, which he called fetishes. But that criticism of the worldly gods, for Marx, is in no way complete, it rather appears in the center, under the name of criticism of the fetishism in relation to the market, money and capital. [1] And 'This is one of the reasons why he changed his language. It seems to me that you also give another reason. The criticism of religion runs always the danger of being directed against a single religion. The rivendicazionne of Marx, however, a universal claim, then el is not limited to a critique of Christianity, with which in fact has begun: he continues his criticism, to get to the heart of political economy, he turns against divinity experienced, worldly and can develop it scientifically. Not you can have empirical experience more of the celestial, as they are invisible to become visible through the celestial stessidei of the worldly, few of these make a body visibly impoverished man enslaved and despised: just the critique of policy can show how worldly of these are capable of this and what are the laws that follow. This is exactly the task of critical political economy. [2]
The Marx later express his qusto imperativo9 categorical: "sviiluppa Capitalist production, therefore, only the technique and the calculation ( Kombination ) of the process of social production, as it stretched nllo time affects the well-springs and sources of all wealth: the land and workers. Now, it is not only men but also of nature, which for Marx as the expansion body of men. There is no human life, no life of nature. (74).
The Marxian critique of religion, when it takes the form of criticism of the fetishism, is a critique of the worldly, which are false gods. Therefore, the criticism presupposes a criterion to distinguish what is false. This is the same criterion, that Marx developed in Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law : man is the highest essence for man himself. Without this criterion, the entire critique of fetishism has not any sense. But there is also another dimension, dunnque, in Marx can also be developed with other words. And 'what Marx in his Theses on Feuerbach (1845), in' German Ideology (1845-47, but for the first time in appparsa 1932) and in the end what makes Manifesto (1848). The critics note on the criterion of the objective world, completely separate from the subjectivity.
Marx exposes the subjectivity of this world objective in the First Thesis on Feuerbach: "The main mistake of all materialism up to now, including Feuerbach, is that the object, the real, the tangible is conceived only in the form of intuition, but not as a human activity significantly, as a practice, that is not subjectively.
Exactly the same argument, Feuerbach, Marx says that he does not, therefore, the significance of revolutionary or practical-critical. This ultimate is, of course, for all practical activities -critihe.
Take the object sempliicemente as the subject implies the reduction of objectivity and not properly assess the objectivity that is subjective. The object is subjective, for Marx, is an objective truth. Here is the inn game, Report for the subject / object, there viam kin against Descartes, Kant or Hegel. Quwat subjectivity is objectively given. The object always involves a dimension of human practice and, as such, is subjective. (74).
When Rosa Luxemburg's criticism of the Russian Revolution, makes the moves from this subjectivity and derives from his conception of democracy: she sees this very subjective subject to the danger of being sacrificed in the name of a false objectivity and subjectivity of this oppression, for her, is a danger to socialism itself.
In the tenth Theses on Feuerbach, Marx concludes that the point of view of materialismoè the old bourgeois society, the view of the new is what socialized humanity.
Here human society is not some kind of marking to distinguish it from animal society. Rather, it is opposed to middle-class members and is a project ... In this context, human society is a society that already has that status, or has the project to become human.
The company has become or is about to become human, for Marx, is contempornamente as socialized humanity. For this reason he can say "human society, or the 'human socialized". So anchquesto must again have a sense I determined, as a point of view too abstractly analytical bourgeois society is 'socializzara'. But both expressions have Marx quoted in the same meaning, quality: here it is dellla umanizzara society, in which man becomes or became such.
I have no doubt that Marx says here that by inferring his categorical imperative, he said in Critique of Hegel's philosophy of public law , namely, that the company has become umanaè this, so the 'yuomo is for man dtersso the Supreme Being. And 'the society of man, which is free to all those relationships that made a man be decreased, shiavizzato and despised.
But what he says in other words, I think one reason is that here Marx is looking for a criterion for atività practical-critical. That man for both men weave a maximum essence, is not a criterion compote. CERTAME is given an orientation, however, Marx still needs a policy. In the Theses on Feuerbach, Marx h again this criterion, but it says in the Communist Manifesto .
"Instead DellaVecchia bourgeois society with its classes and class contradddizioni, is the association, in which the free development of each is the libefo development of all."
From this time on, this is the criterion for the road, which is Human maximum essenz \u0026lt;man himself.
This criterion is a criterion for action from razionlità than human. From this moment on sensitive human activity becomes practice [3] since become subject ... (75).
The criterion is: the development of each is the condition for the development of all. It can be the same in other ways: the life of each is the condition for the life of all or: self-realization of each is the condition autorealizzazioe for everyone. Marx speaks of the free development of each, but this freedom is not an additional predicate. But the development of each other as a condition of development is the definition of freedom for Marx . (75 °) [4] Marx contrasts this criterion of rationality to the policy of razionlità dellla bourgeois society. The latter is, I become myself, so I win another and marginalizes them. Said in terms of classical greek I have proof of being free, because I own the slaves.
The paradigm of critical thinking finds its completion in Marxist mentioned criterion. This shows that there is no vfrattura between the young and the mature Marx, the development of a single location. Marx broke with Feuerbach, as he writes Thesis on Feuerbach: a long time he had broken with the Feuerbach Qusta fottura is already fully expressed in the preface to his doctoral thesis [5]
[1] - So, for Marx There are two levels of religion: the celestial and the mundane: if the latter is the material basis of the first, then the criticism of the first remains incomplete until it is exercised even the critics at the second level.
[2] - It should be noted: in Marx, the critique of political economy is not an end in itself, but depending on the process of liberation of man: for this critical to the heavenly and earthly gods are the two sides of one coin.
[4] - The reason Marx Leben Leben erzeugendes and the Hegelian of Befreiung , of \u200b\u200bcourse, are put together, but are also married to Kant, 2554: 138, 173, which condemns suicide, seen as a paradox of freedom, ie of its use against man and not because he humanly alive, please keep in mind, too, Kant, 2554: 183, which highlights the link between the principle of erzeugendes Leben Leben conception of pleasure and not as a condition, but even as movement activities.
[5] - criticism of Althusser about Marx's humanism. Not so much against Marxism Althusser 'Soviet', but rather against some reaction to it, which ended up losing the science of Marxism in the name of humanism. (Rauber, 8351: 16a). Althusser does not accept that, in Marxism, the philosophy is dissolved in science (history) (Rauber, 8351: 16s). What is the point of explaining to Althusser groped Marxist philosophy ((Rauber, 8351: 17). For Althusser, the limit of the essential dialectic of Hegel lies in his being linked to teleologism idea: in other words, the systematic closure due the fact that the idea is coming to visit with her identity. (Rauber, 8351:18). Equivoco dell'antiteleologismo is shown by the same A., that in fact it has both a free predetermined punto de llegada, and as devoid of any punto de llegada (Rauber, 8351: 18b) [5] inconsistency of Althusser (Rauber, 8351: 19). Rauber, 8351: 20 of all Specialties of the Soviet Union about Marx / Hegel, Marx uses because they do not understand how Hegel against Hegel. Rauber, 8351: 20th recognizes the presence not only of Hegel in Marx, but in general the classical German philosophy (FCT). E. Dussell about the presence, in Marx, Schelling (Rauber, 8351: 20b)
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